Hal Taylor Associates, a Utah Corporation v. Unionamerica, Inc., a Corporation, aka Westmor; Ramshire, Inc., a Corporation; William R. Stevenson; Park City Reservations, Inc, a Corporation dba Skyline Realty; Harry F. Reed and Gary Cole : Brief of Respondents Unionamerica, aka Westmor Ramshire, Inc. and William R. Stevenson by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Hal Taylor Associates, a Utah Corporation v.
Unionamerica, Inc., a Corporation, aka Westmor;
Ramshire, Inc., a Corporation; William R.
Stevenson; Park City Reservations, Inc, a
Corporation dba Skyline Realty; Harry F. Reed and
Gary Cole : Brief of Respondents Unionamerica,
aka Westmor Ramshire, Inc. and William R.
Stevenson
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errorsP.S. Prince, Jr.; Attorney for Respondents Unionamerica, Inc.,
Ramshire, Inc., and William R. StevensonStephen G. Crockett; Attorney for Respondents Park City
Reservations, Inc., Harry F. Reed and Gary ColeKent B. Linebaugh; Attorneys for Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, No. 17359 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2519
I 
lo.. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah ) 
Corpor&tion, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corpora- ) 
tion, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, ) 
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM ) 
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESER- ) 
VATIONS, INC., a corporation ) 
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. ) 
REED and GARY COLE, ) 
) 
Defendants-Respondents. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-> 
Case No. 17359 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, AKA WESTMORr 
RAMSHIRE, INC. f and 
WILLIAM R. STEVENSON 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
!N AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF t1l'A8 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
P. s. Prince, Jr. Esq., 
James A. Boevers Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDIAllL8R 
Salt Lake City, utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Unionamerica, Inc., Ral!Blilb:v,, 
and William R. Stevenson 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. 
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL 
36 South State Street, No. 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Responden~s 
Park City Reservations, Inc., Harry 
and Gary Cole 
P. Reed 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corpora-
tion, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, 
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM 
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESER-
VATIONS, INC., a corporation 
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. 
REED and GARY COLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 17359 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, AKA WESTMOR; 
RAMSHIRE, INC.; and 
WILLIAM R. STEVENSON 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT 
OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA, JUDGE 
Kent B. Linebaugh, Esq. 
F. s. Prince, Jr. Esq., 
James A. Boevers Esq. 
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Unionamerica, Inc., Ramshire, Inc., 
and William R. Stevenson 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. 
MARTINEAU, ROOKER, LARSEN & KIMBALL 
36 South State Street, No. 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondents 
Park City Reservations, Inc., Harry F. Reed 
and Gary Cole 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
l\RGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, INC. AND STEVENSON 
OWED NO FICUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANT, AND OWED 
NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IM-
PLIED, ORAL OR WRITTEN, TO REFER WALK-INS TO 
11 
APPELLANT • • • • • • • • . • • • • • • 11 
A. RESPONDENT PRINCIPALS OWED NO 
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANT HTA 
AS THEIR AGENT • • • • . • • • 11 
B. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE RULING OF 
THE TRIAL COURT THAT NEITHER THE 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT NOR THE LISTING 
AGREEMENT CONTAINED ANY EXPRESS OR 
IMPLIED REQUIREMENTS THAT UNION-
AMERICA REFER WALK-INS TO APPELLANT, 
AND THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
ORAL AGREEMENT BY UNIONAMERICA APART 
FROM THESE WRITTEN AGREEMENTS • • • • 14 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, INC. AND STEVENSON 
ACTED IN C,OOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO THE 
REFERRAL OF JACK DAVIS, AND ACTED IN GOOD 
FAITH, WITH APPELLANT'S CONSENT, AND IN 
RELIANCE UPON THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL, IN 
DEPOSITING THE $96,000 COMMISSION IN AN 
INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT PENDING 
RESOLUTION OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN APPELLANT 
AND RESPONDENT SKYLINE, AND THERE IS NO 
BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 24 
A. RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH 
REGARDING THE REFERRAL OF JACK 
DAVIS • • • • • • • • • • • • 24 
i 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
B. RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, 
WITH APPELLANT'S CONSENT, AND IN 
RELIANCE UPON THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL 
IN DEPOSITING THE $96,000 COMMISSION 
IN AN INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT, 
AND THERE IS NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF 
PUNITIVE DAMAGES • . , , , , . , • , . 26 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION IN DECIDING NOT TO AWARD COSTS AND 
ATTORNEYS' FEES TO APPELLANT, AND APPELLANT 
IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEES 
INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL 30 
CONCLUSION • • • 31 
ii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES 
Bates v. Bates, 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977) 
Beasley-Kelso Associates, Inc. v. Fenney, 30 
Page 
31 
N.C. App. 708, 228 S.E.2d 620 (1976) 20 
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978) 13 
Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 
146 P. 2d 284 ( 1944) • • • . • • • . , • , • 28 
Camino v. Simon, 203 Okla. 234, 219 P.2d 1018, (1950) 20 
Campbell v. Sickels, 197 Va. 298, 89 S.E.2d 14 (1955) 12 
Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1975) 
Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 
562 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1977) 
Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976) 
Continental National Bank v. Evans, 
107 Ariz. 378, 489 P.2d 15 (1971) • 
23 
22 
30 
27 
Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d. 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970). 23 
Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah 2d. 286, 
495 P. 2d 811, ( 1972) •••• 
Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham, 
14 Wash. App. 128, 539 P.2d 868 (1975) 
Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 (Utah 1976) 
22 
20 
30 
Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (1949) 23 
Holley v, Federal American Partners, 
29 Utah 2d 212, 507 P. 2d 381, ( 1973) ••••• • • • • • 18 
Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. App. 446, 
409 P.2d 730, (1966) •••• , • • • • • • • • 16 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976) • • • • • 22 
iii 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Page 
Mann v. American Western Life Insurance Co., 
586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978) •••••••••• • • • . 14, 19 
Maw v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, 
20 Utah 2d 195, 436 P.2d 230 (1968) 
Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P. 2d 775 (Utah 1978) 
Olsen v. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 235 P.2d 510, (1951) 
Pacific Horizon Distributing, Inc. v. Wilson, 
249 Ore. 591, 439 P.2d 874, (1968) 
Palombi v. D. & c. Builders, 22 Utah 2a 297, 
452 P.2d 325, (1969) •••• 
People's Finance & Thrift Co. of Ogden v. Doman, 
497 P.2d 17, 27 Utah 2d. 404 (1972) .•• 
Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1958) 
Santi v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 
21 Utah 157, 442 P.2d 921 (1968) 
Sine v. Harper, 118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571, (1950) 
Smith v. Phlegar, 73 Ariz. 11, 236 P.2d 749 (1951) 
Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977) 
27 
26 
20 
18 
28 
23 
16 
22 
23 
20 
30 
Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 
227 Kan. 45, 605 P.2d 95 (1980) • • • • • • • • • • • • • 27 
Tippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
44 Cal. 2r:l 136, 280 P.2d 775 (1955) 
Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 (Wyo. 1972) 
Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 
538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975) •••••• • •••. • • • • • 
SECONDARY AUTHORITIES 
12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers § 100 •• 
Restatement of Torts 2d § 87la 
Williston on Contracts§ 1819 (3d ed., 1972) 
Williston on Contracts § 1300 et. ~ 
(3rd ed., 1972) ••••••• 
iv 
...... 
20 
27 
12 
12 
23 
28 
29 
-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDICES 
Appendix A - The Settlement Agreement dated February 17, 1977. 
Appendix B - The Listing Agreement dated February 17, 1977. 
Appendix C - Judge Croft's Order dated June 4, 1979. 
Appendix D - Memorandum Decision of Judge Sawaya. 
Appendix E - Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Judge 
Sawaya. 
Appendix F - Judgment of Judge Sawaya. 
Appendix G - Judge Conder's Order dated September 5, 1978. 
v Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corpora-
tion, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, 
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM 
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESER-
VATIONS, INC., a corporation 
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. 
REED and GARY COLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 17359 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, AKA WESTMOR; 
RAMSHIRE, INC,; and 
WILLIAM R. STEVENSON 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a dispute between appellant, the listing broker 
of a piece of real property sold by respondent Unionamerica, 
Inc., and respondent Park City Reservations, Inc., as to the 
rights of the respective parties to a real estate commission of 
$96,000 heretofore deposited by Unionamerica, Inc. in an 
interest bearing escrow account for the benefit of appellant and 
Park City Reservations, Inc. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a trial, the court awarded 60% of the deposited 
commission (amounting to $57,600 plus interest) to respondent 
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Park City Reservations, Inc., and 40% of the deposited com-
mission ($38,400 plus interest) to appellant. The court also 
awarded appellant a judgment against respondent Unionamerica in 
the amount of $2,550 plus interest, as the commission due on a 
second sale of real property. The court ruled that appellant 
was not entitled to compensatory damages over and above its 
share of the real estate commimssions, and ruled that appellant 
was not entitled to punitive damages, attorneys' fees or costs, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents request that the trial court judgment be 
affirmed in all respects. Only Point II, Point III and Point IV 
of appellant's brief apply to respondents Unionamerica, Inc,; 
Ramshire, Inc.; and Stephenson; and these are the only points 
that will be addressed herein. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Transcript of Proceedings contained in the ~co~ 
on Appeal will be referred to by the letters "Tr." followed by 
the transcript page number(s), and exhibits will be referred~ 
as "Ex." followed by the exhibit number ( s) • There is no dispute 
that respondent Unionamerica, Inc. and its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, respondent Ramshire, Inc. are one and the same for 
purposes of this action and they will be referred to together as 
"Unionamerica". Appellant will be referred to also as "HTA": 
Hal Taylor will be referred to as "Taylor"; respondent Park 
-2-
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city Reservations, Inc. dba Skyline Realty will be referred to 
as "Skyline" and respondents Stevenson, Reed and Cole will be 
referred to by their surnames. 
The following statement of facts will briefly discuss 
only the facts necessary to supplement, clarify or controvert 
those facts contained in appellant's Statement of Facts that 
pertain to the claims against Unionamerica and Stevenson. 
On February 17, 1977 Taylor and HTA entered into a 
written agreement (the Settlement Agreement) settling a prior 
lawsuit brought by them against Unionamerica and Greater Park 
City Company (GPCC), who is not a party to the present action. 
The Settlement Agreement required both Unionamerica and GPCC to 
enter into exclusive listing agreements with HTA as to all 
Summit County real estate either of them might wish to sell 
during a period of five (5) years. (Trial Court Finding No. 9, 
Appendix E) 
The Settlement Agreement stated as follows: 
On all property listed with Taylor, he will 
be required to perform the usual real estate 
broker activities and will be entitled to a 
commission rate, of six percent (6%), and Taylor 
will further agree to a fee-splitting arrangement 
giving sixty percent (60%) to the selling broker 
and forty percent (40%) to the listing broker. 
(Ex. P-2, Appendix A) 
Also on February 17, 1977, pursuant to and consistent 
with the Settlement Agreement, Unionamerica entered into a writ-
ten Vacant Property Listing Agreement (the Listing Agreement) 
with HTA for the sale of approximately 10.5 acres of property 
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(the Village Property) owned by Unionamerica in Park City Ut h 
, a • 
The Listing Agreement was on the stanjard form generally used in 
the community and gave HTA the exclusive right to sell the 
Village Property in return for a 6% commission to be paid no 
matter who might sell the property during the listing period. 
(Trial Court Finding No. 10, Appendix E; Ex. P-3, Appendix B.) 
On their face, neither the Settlement Agreement nor the 
Listing Agreement required the owner to direct inquiries from 
prospective buyers to HTA. (Tr. 177 - 178.) Throughout dis-
covery and the trial, HTA's counsel referred to prospective 
buyers who might direct inquiries about the property to the 
owner as "walk-ins" and, for the sake of clarity, appellees will 
hereinafter use that term. Taylor on behalf of HTA, Stevenson 
on behalf of Unionamerica, and Ray Johnson (Johnson) on behalf 
of GPCC were the individuals who prepared the Settlement Agree-
ment. Their recollections as to conversations on February 17, 
1977 concerning such "walk-in" buyers vary. 
Although Taylor testified at trial that the parties 
orally agreed that walk-ins to either Unionamerica or GPCC would 
be referred to HTA (Tr. 51), his "recollection" did not occur 
until well after this action was filed and appeared to be based 
on the testimony of GPCC's Johnson (Tr. 142 - 143.) Taylor 
could not specifically recall what was said during the conver-
sations or whether Stevenson actually said he would refer walk-
ins to HTA (Tr. 152 - 154). In his early pleadings, filed 
before he talked to Johnson, Taylor made no mention of such an 
-4-
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oral agreement. 
Although Johnson testified that there was an agreement 
to refer walk-ins to HTA, he appeared to be referring to persons 
"walking in" as a result of a $5,000 joint advertising campaing 
proposed between Unionamerica and HTA (Tr. 202). Johnson's 
recollection on this point was also hazy, and Taylor testified 
that the proposed joint advertising campaign was never performed 
( Tr • 1 2 4 - 12 5 ) • 
Stevenson's recollection of the February 17 conversa-
tions concerning walk-ins was quite different. He testified 
that the subject came up only because GPCC did not wish to sell 
properties at the time the Settlement Agreement was made. 
Taylor wanted to know what would happen if a prospective buyer 
approached GPCC with an offer to purchase unlisted properties. 
Johnson stated that HTA would still get a commission. Stevenson 
said he did not participate in the discussion because Union-
america wanted to list its properties immediately and therefore 
the discussion did not apply to Unionamerica. The question of 
walk-ins, as defined by appellant's counsel, was not discussed 
and never occurred to Stevenson at the time (Tr. 295 -296, 301, 
360 - 361). 
Since neither the Settlement Agreement nor the Listing 
Agreement referred to the subject of walk-ins, and since the 
Settlement Agreement expressly provided that someone other than 
HTA could become a selling broker entitled to 60% of the 
commission, Judge Croft ruled prior to trial that neither 
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agreement contained any express or implied provision requiring 
Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to HTA (Judge Croft's Order of 
June 4, 1979, Appendix C). Judge Sawaya adopted Judge Croft's 
Order at trial (See Memorandum Decision of Judge Sawaya dated 
May 7, 1980, Appendix D). Although Taylor contended at trial 
that he relied on the exclusive right to sell language as 
covering the referral of walk-ins (Tr. 136 - 137), evidence of 
customary usage of this language in the real estate industry d~ 
not support Taylor's interpretation (Tr. 172), and there was no 
evidence that Stevenson or Unionamerica could have been aware of 
such "customary usage" even if it existed. 
At trial, after hearing the testimony of Taylor, 
Johnson and Stevenson, and after assessing the credibility of 
each, Judge Sawaya found that there was no oral agreement to 
refer walk-ins to HTA, and no mutual mistake or fraud that would 
have justified reforming the Settlement Agreement or Listing 
Agreement (See Memorandum Decision dated May 7, 1980; Appendix 
D, Finding of Fact No. 11, Appendix E). Although HTA contended 
that custom and practice in the real estate industry required 
Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to the listing broker, Taylor 
testified that this case represented the first time he had been 
confronted with the issue of whether walk-ins had to be referred 
to the listing broker (Tr. 136). 
Shortly after the Settlement and Listing Agreements of 
February 17, 1977, Taylor, on behalf of HTA, contacted Skyline 
and other real estate brokers to seek their assistance in 
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selling the Village Property, and offered to give 60% of the 
commission to any broker that sold the Village Property (Finding 
of Fact No. 12, Appendix E; Tr. 117 - 118). 
Around October 1, 1977, Jack Davis (Davis), the even-
tual purchaser of the Village Property, had a telephone consver-
sation with Robert Volk (Volk), the president of Unionamerica, 
concerning the Village Property. Davis was referred to Volk by 
Gordon Luce (Luce), a Unionamerica director who knew of Davis' 
interest in purchasing resort properties and knew of the availa-
bility of the Village Property. Davis and Volk agreed to meet 
in Park City on October 3 and Volk requested that Stevenson 
meet them there also (Deposition of Volk, pp. 18 - 24; Deposi-
tion of Davis, pp. 14 - 15; Tr. 323; Findings No. 13 and 14, 
Appendix E). 
Stevenson called HTA to find out if Taylor could be 
present at the meeting with Davis, in case he was needed to 
answer questions. Stevenson was informed that Taylor was in San 
Francisco and would not return until later in the week. 
Stevenson did not request to be put in touch with Taylor because 
he did not know how interested Davis was in the Village Property 
and did not want to ask Taylor to return from San Francisco just 
on the possibility he might be needed to answer questions. 
Stevenson did not ask to speak with Ken Oswald (Oswald), a 
salesman in the HTA office acquainted with Stevenson, because he 
did not have confidence in Oswald's abilities (Tr. 368 - 370; 
Finding No. 17, Appendix E). 
-7-
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On October 3, 1977, Stevenson met Volk at the Salt Lake 
City airport. Volk informed Stevenson that Volk would not be 
able to meet with Davis, and Volk asked Stevenson to go without 
him. Stevenson then cal led Cole because he knew Cole and knew 
Cole worked for Reed at Skyline. Stevenson had confidence in 
Reed's abilities and wanted a broker to be available if needed 
(Tr. 325 - 327, 371; Finding No. 18, Appendix E). 
Stevenson met with Davis and Davis' wife on October 3 
and was asked some questions concerning potential development of 
the Village Property which he could not answer. He then 
arranged for Reed and Cole to meet himself and the Davises on 
October 4, at which time they visited the Village Property (Tr. 
372 - 373; Finding No. 19, Appendix E), 
On October 17, 1977 Stevenson, on behalf of 
Unionamerica, and Davis both signed an earnest money agreement, 
negotiated and prepared by Reed and Cole, for the purchase and 
sale of the Village Property (Tr. 344 - 347; Ex. P-9). Neither 
Taylor nor HTA were involved in the negotiations culminating in 
this agreement nor, indeed, even met Davis until October 24 
(Tr. 78 - 81). On October 26, 1977 Stevenson and Davis executed 
a real estate contract calling for multiple closings (Ex. P-12; 
Finding No. 12, Appendix E). 
The evidence showed that the sale to Davis was consum-
mated only as the result of the substantial time and effort 
devoted by Reed, Cole and Skyline. Since Davis was new to Park 
City, Reed had to sell Davis on the potential of the area for 
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real estate development (Tr. 457 - 459). Reed and Cole also met 
with both StevPnson and Davis in California to negotiate the 
terms of the sale (Tr. 344 - 347, 411 - 414). Because the terms 
of the real estate contract (Ex. P-12) permitted Davis to 
withdraw from the deal if the development that was planned 
became unfeasible, Reed and Cole worked exhaustively for several 
months after October, 1977 in order to insure that the project 
cleared the various hurdles encountered by a major real estate 
development, so that Davis would go through with the sale (Tr. 
597 - 602). It was this latter effort that was the most time 
consuming and perhaps the most important. 
At no time did Stevenson attempt to conceal or 
misrepresent the source of the buyer. The first conversation 
between Taylor and Stevenson concerning Davis occurred on 
October 19, 1977, at which time Stevenson fully disclosed to 
Taylor how Davis learned of the Villaqe Property (Tr. 88). When 
Stevenson first referred Davis to Reed and Cole, it was not for 
the purpose of forcing Taylor or HTA to split any commission 
(Tr. 329, 379). 
Stevenson believed the term "selling broker" was used 
in the Settlement Agreement to mean the broker that brought in 
an offer from a buyer that was accepted and that resulted in a 
closed sale through the efforts of that broker, and believed 
that Reed, Cole and Skyline had performed these functions (Tr. 
378), and the trial court so found (Finding No. 27, Appendix E). 
However at a meeting held on October 24, 1977, Taylor demanded 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to be paid 100% of the $96, 000 commission that resulted from the 
sale of tre Village Property (Tr. 90, Ex. P-10). Taylor testi-
fied he did not recall what he said at that meeting (Tr. 96), 
However, Stevenson and Reed were both present and testified that 
Taylor indicated that he would not agree to pay 60% of the com-
mission to Skyline as the selling broker because of his personal 
animosity toward Cole (Tr. 595 - 596, 610 - 611, 644). Steven-
son and Reed also testified that at this meeting Taylor orally 
agreed that the entire commission could be placed in escrow 
until the dispute between HTA and Skyline was resolved, although 
he did not sign the real estate agreement containing the escrow 
provision (Tr. 354, 472 - 473, 597; Ex. P-11). A subsequent 
letter from HTA's counsel indicated acquiescence in an escrow 
agreement (Ex. D-19). 
Because of the conflicting claims to the $96,000 
commission, and based upon the advice of counsel, Unionamerica 
deposited the entire amount into an interest-bearing escrow 
account at the time of the first closing in May, 1978 (Tr. 355, 
375 - 376, 418). By order of the district court dated September 
5, 1978, the parties were required to maintain this sum in the 
interest-bearing account, subject to withdrawal only upon order 
of the court (Appendix G). After judgment in this action, the 
district court ordered the release of 40% of the commission 
t HTA b d Upon the St ipulation of all part~s plus interest o , ase 
dated February 6, 1981. 
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The trial court ruled that Unionamerica's deposit of 
the commission into an <~scrow account was reasonable under the 
circumstances, found that Unionamerica breached no fiduciary or 
other duty to HTA, did not award compensatory or punitive dama-
ges or attorney's fees, and ruled that each party would bear its 
own costs (Finding No. 26, Conclusions of Law No. 8 and No. 9, 
Appendix E; Judgment, Appendix F). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, INC. AND STEVENSON <:MED NO 
FIDUCIARY DUTY TO APPELLANT, AND OWED NO CONTRACTUAL DUTY, 
WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, ORAL OR WRITTEN, TO REFER WALK-INS 
TO APPELLANT. 
A. RESPONDENT PRINCIPALS OWED NO FIDUCIARY DUTY TO 
APPELLANT HTA AS THEIR AGENT. 
In point IIA. of its brief, appellant appears to con-
tend that because appellant as agent owed a fiduciary duty to 
its principal, Unionamerica, there is also a fiduciary duty owed 
by Unionamerica to appellant. Apopellant cites no authority for 
this proposition, probably because there is none. The cited 
portions of Am. Jur. 2d relied upon by appellant do not indicate 
that the duty owed by a principal to its agent is a fiduciary 
duty. Instead, they state that the only duties owed by a prin-
cipal to its agent are contractual duties and the implied duty 
to act in good faith that is a part of every contract. See 
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q 
also, Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 19?S), 
Am. Jur. 2d directly contradicts the very contention 
for which appellant cites it. 12 Am. Jur. 2d Brokers s 100, p, 
851 states as follows: 
••• in the ordinary transaction there is no trust 
and confidence reposed by the broker in the 
principal, as there is by the principal in the 
broker, 
There is practically no case law discussing a claim 
that a principal owes a fiduciary duty to its agent, simply 
because there is so little merit to such a claim that it is 
rarely raised. However, in Campbell v. Sickels, 197 Va. 298, 
89 S.E.2d 14 (1955) a claim similar to HTA's claim here was 
rejected. In that case plaintiff real estate broker and defu~ 
dant landowner entered into an exclusive right to sell agreement 
which required the payment of a commission to the broker, 
regardless of who made the sale. The agreement also fixed the 
terms upon which the owner was willing to sell. The broker 
obtained an offer that was different than the terms fixed in t~ 
agreement, and the owner not only refused the offer hut also 
refused to tell the broker why the offer was not acceptable. In 
response to the broker's claim that the owner acted in bad 
faith, analogous to HTA' s claim presently before this court, the 
Virginia Supreme Court stated as follows: 
The duty of a landowner to a broker is 
different from the duty of a broker to a land-
owner. The broker occupies a fiduciary relation 
to his client and so long as that relation con-
tinues he is under a legal obligation, as well as 
a high moral duty, to give his principal loyal 
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service and the benefit of his information as to 
the propert~ entrusted to him for sale ••• 
There is no such confidential relation 
flowing from the princ1~al to the broker. A 
principal's contractual duty is to compensate 
his broker for services rendered in accordance 
with his contract of employment, and so long as 
the relation of principal and agent exists to 
exercise good faith toward him. (89 S.E. 2d at 
18 - 19, footnotes deleted, emphasis added.) 
The good faith duty referred to by the court meant good 
faith in carrying out the terms of the contract, not a good 
faith duty separate and apart from the contract. This is 
apparent from the court's ruling that the landowner had no duty 
to the broker to modify the terms of sale set forth in her 
agreement with the broker, or to accept an offer that did not 
meet those terms. 
In the case at hand, the only duty of Unionamerica and 
Stevenson to HTA was to act in good faith in carrying out the 
terms of the Settlement Agreement and the Listing Agreement. As 
will be discussed more fully below, the trial court correctly 
ruled that neither of these agreements contained any express or 
implied provision regarding walk-ins, nor any oral or written 
agreement requiring respondents to refer walk-in buyers to 
appellant. 
~he question of whether a fiduciary relationship exists 
is a question of fact for the trial court Blodgett v. Martsch, 
590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). TO accept appellant's position would 
mean that the attorney's fiduciary duty to his client creates a 
fiduciary duty from the client to his attorney, which is 
nonsense. Unionamerica and Stevenson owed HTA no duty other 
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than contractual duties. See also, Mann v. American Western 
Life Insurance Co., 586 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978). 
ments. 
B. THE RECORD SUPPORTS THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT 
THAT NEITHER THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT NOR THE LIST-
ING AGREEMENT CONTAINED ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED 
REQUIREMENT THAT UNIONAMERICA REFER WALK-INS TO 
APPELLANT, AND THE FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO ORAL 
AGREEMENT BY UNIONAMERICA APART FROM THESE WRITTEN 
AGREEMENTS. 
1. No express or implied terms in the written agree-
At trial, Taylor conceded the obvious fact that neither 
the Settlement Agreement nor the Listing Agreement contained 
language expressly requiring Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to 
HTA (Tr. 177 - 178). Taylor also conceded that the only 
language relied upon as implying this requirement is the 
language in the Listing Agreement giving HTA the exclusive right 
to sell the Village Property ana providing that the commission 
must be paid even if Unionamerica is the procuring cause of t~ 
sale (Tr. 135 - 136). In Point II.13. of its brief, HTA argues 
that the one who first "finds" the buyer is always the procuring 
cause of the sale and that since Unionamerica would be the 
finder of any walk-in buyer and therefore the procuring cause of 
a sale to any walk-in, it would be required by the Listing 
Agreement to refer walk-ins to HTA. 
Unionamerica and Stevenson cannot be held liable to pay 
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any party any amount other than the amount already paid into 
escrow, regardless of the outcome of the E·rocuring cause issue, 
Nevertheless, these respondents must point out that appellant 
rnischaracterizes Judge Croft's order entered prior to trial 
(Appendix C), as well as the law generally in arguing that 
Unionamerica impliedly agreed to refer walk-ins to appellant. 
Appellant contends that Judge Croft ruled that in order 
for Skyline to have been the procuring cause of the sale of the 
Village Property, entitled to 60% of the commission as the 
selling broker, Skyline had to both "find" the buyer and 
"negotiate" the sale. Appellant further contends that this is 
inconsistent with Judge Croft's unequivocal ruling in the same 
order that no implied provision of the written agreements 
required Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to appellant. 
The only inconsistency in Judge Croft's order is 
created by appellant's misinterpretation of that order. Judge 
Croft made no determination that a "selling broker" must both 
find a buyer and negotiate an agreement in order to become a 
procuring cause of a sale. Even a cursory reading of the order 
reveals that Judge Croft's use of the words "find" and 
"negotiate" were not intended to create an absolute standard 
which a "selling broker" must meet, but were intended only to 
indicate in a general sense that the parties to the Settlement 
Agreement intended to motivate brokers other than HTA to attempt 
to sell the Village Property, by offering these brokers 60% of 
the commission. 
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At no time since this action was filed have any of ~e 
respondents ever contended that anyone other than Unionamerica 
"found" Jack Davis, the buyer. If this fact alone barred 
Skyline's right to 60% of the commission, Judge Croft would not 
have found that " ••• further issues of fact remain to be 
determined ••• ". At trial, Judge Sawaya did not interpret Judge 
Croft's order as setting the standard for a "selling broker" n~ 
was he asked to by appellant. The Memorandum Decision and 
Findings of Fact entered by Judge Sawaya showed that he felt 
bound by the binding portions of Judge Croft's order, but not by 
any offhand use of the words "find" and "negotiate" (Appendices 
D and E). 
Implicit in Judge Sawaya's finding that Skyline per-
formed the obligations of a selling broker is the proposition 
that the one who negotiates and closes the sale is the procurinc 
cause even if someone else "finds" the buyer (Finding No. 27, 
Appendix E). This proposition is supported by the case law. Ir 
cases where more than one broker is eligible to make a sale, if 
the broker who "finds" the buyer is not able to negotiate or 
close a sale, and another broker is able to negotiate and close 
a sale with the same buyer, the latter broker is the procuring 
cause of the sale. Hurley v. Kallof, 2 Ariz. App. 446, 409 P.2< 
730 (1966); Reed v. Taylor, 322 P.2d 147 (Wyo. 1958). Although 
these are not exclusive listing cases, they are analogous ~ ili 
case at hand. When the Settlement Agreement and Listing Agree· 
ment are construed together, as they must be, HTA' s only exclu· 
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sive right was to be paid 40% of the commission. Whether HTA 
or another broker was entitled to the 60% selling broker's com-
mission depended upon who was the procuring cause of the sale. 
Even assuming Davis had been referred to HTA or "found" by HTA, 
if another broker negotiated and closed the sale, the other 
broker might well be the procuring cause and HTA would not be 
entitled to the selling broker's commission. 
It is clear from the facts that after Unionamerica 
"found" Davis, the negotiation and closing of the sale were per-
formed exclusively through Skyline. After Davis visited the 
Village Property on October 4, 1977, neither Stevenson nor 
Unionamerica had any contact with Davis until October 17, 1977 
when Reed called Stevenson to discuss the Davis offer which 
Unionamerica accepted after negotiating through Reed (Tr. 343 -
350). HTA certainly was not involved in finding the buyer or 
negotiating or closing the sale, and even its 40% commission was 
earned through the efforts of Skyline. 
Common sense alone dictates that the minimal involve-
ment of Luce, Volk and Stevenson did not bring about the sale of 
a piece of property for $1,600,000 to a man who had never before 
been to Park City. Reed and Cole sold Davis on Park City and 
the Village Property, then negotiated the terms of the written 
agreements, and, most importantly, made sure that the development 
of the property would materialize so that Davis would not exer-
cise his option to withdraw from the sale (Tr. 344 - 347, 411 
414, 457 - 459, 597 - 602). The evidence overwhelmingly sup-
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
---
ported the finding of fact by the trial court that Skyline per-
formed the obligations of a selling broker, and there is no 
basis for disturbing that finding on appeal (Finding No, 27, 
Appendix E). Neither the facts nor the law supported HTA's 
theory that Unionamerica was the procuring cause of the sale to 
the walk-in buyer, or that it therefore had an implied obliga-
tion to refer Davis to HTA. 
Paragraph 36(c) of the fact statement in appellant's 
brief indicates that under an exclusive right to sell listing, 
custom and practice in the real estate industry in the State ~ 
Utah impliedly obligates the owner to refer walk-ins to the 
listing broker. However, the parties' stipulation at trial 
regarc'I ing the contents of the real estate manual rel iec'l upon by 
Taylor did not include this obligation in describing an exclu-
sive right to sell listing, and Taylor testified that he had 
never before been confronted with the issue of whether an exclu-
sive right to sell listing impliedly obligated the owner to 
refer walk-ins to the listing broker (Tr. 136, 172). Even if 
such a custom and practice existed, it was binding only upon 
those who knew or should have known of its existence. Holley v. 
Federal American Partners, 507 P,2d 381, 29 Utah 2d 212 (1973), 
Pacific Horizon Distributing, Inc. v. Wilson, 439 P, 2d 874, 249 
Ore 591 ( 1968). Testimony at trial indicated that Stevenson was 
not a real estate broker or salesman at any relevant time and 
that he had been involved in Unionamerica' s real estate trans-
actions for a relatively short time before the events in 
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question (Tr. 274 - 276). There was no evidence that either 
unionamerica or Stevenson knew or could have known of the 
alleged custom and practice. 
No implied covenant to act in good faith in carrying 
out the terms of the Settlement Agreement and Listing Agreement 
required Unionamerica to refer walk-ins to HTA. The duty to act 
in good faith does not add to or vary the terms of these agree-
ments. See, Mann v. American Western Life Insurance Co., supra. 
The only commission that was guaranteed to HTA under these 
agreements was the 40% listing broker commission. The only act 
by Unionamerica that could have frustrated HTA's right to that 
commission was refusal of the Davis offer. The referral to Sky-
line did not frustrate that right; it led to the sale from which 
the 40% commission to HTA flowed. 
The Settlement Agreement and the Listing Agreement were 
both executed on the same day as a part of the same transaction 
and must be construed together. The Settlement Agreement made 
the exclusive right to sell in the Listing Agreement non-exclu-
sive. The Settlement Agreement was not just an agreement among 
brokers to split commissions based upon some form of multiple 
listing. As Judge Croft ruled, it was an agreement between 
Unionamerica and HTA to give brokers other than HTA a right to 
sell the Village Property. HTA was not entitled to become the 
procuring cause other than by its own efforts. The referral of 
Davis to Skyline did not make Skyline the procuring cause and 
did not deprive HTA of the opportunity to become the procuring 
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.. 
cause since there was no way to tell whether the Davis referral 
would result in a sale (Tr. 369). Skyline became the procuri~ 
cause by its own efforts. 
Courts will not construe contracts as containing 
implien terms that add to or vary the substantive rights and 
responsibilities created by express terms, nor will they find 
implied terms which the parties are likely to have stated in 
express language had they intended to include those terms at 
all. Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillingham, 539 P.2d 868, H 
Wash. App. 128 (1975); Smith v. Phlegar, 236 P.2d 749, 73 Ariz. 
11 (1951); Tippman v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 280 P.2d 775, 44 
Cal. 2d 136 ( 1955); Camino v. Simon, 219 P. 2d 1018, 203 Okla. 
234 (1950). The duty to refer walk-ins is a term that HTA and 
Unionamerica would have included expressly, if they had intended 
to include it at all. See, Beasley-Kelso Associates, Inc. v. 
Fenney, 228 S.E.2d 620, 30 N.C. App. 708 (1976) in which the 
brokerage contract expressly specified that the owner had to 
refer walk-ins to the broker, in return for a reduction of the 
commission due on a sale to a walk-in, as an incentive to the 
owner. If Unionamerica impliedly agreed to refer walk-ins to 
HTA, did HTA impliedly agree to accept a reduced commission on a 
sale to a walk-in, as an incentive or consideration for such 
referrals? At best, the Listing Agreement's silence as to walk· 
ins is an ambiguity, which under Utah law, must be construed 
against HTA as the broker who prepared the agreement. Olse~ 
Kidman, 235 P.2d 510, 120 Utah 443 (1951). 
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2. No Oral Agreement 
Since the District Court ruled prior to trial that the 
written agreements contained no express or implied provisions 
regarding walk-ins, HTA's theory at trial was that these agree-
ments had to be reformed to reflect an oral agreement that the 
parties made. The trial court found no such oral agreement and 
it is unclear whether HTA is contesting this finding on appeal. 
What is clear is that HTA did not meet its burden of proof on 
this issue, which is a heavy burden in light of the statute of 
frauds and parole evidence barriers. 
Even though Judge Sawaya was bound by Judge Croft's 
earlier ruling, the trial court considered much the same evi-
dence on the oral agreement issue as would be considered on the 
implied agreement issue, and found appellant's evidence unper-
suasive. This evidence consisted of testimony by Taylor, 
Johnson and Stevenson concerning conversations they had during 
the preparation of the Settlement Agreement on February 17, 
1977. Naturally, the passage of time impaired the recollections 
of all three witnesses; none of them could remember what was 
actually said; and there were significant differences in the 
testimony of each. Taylor's memory must be questioned because 
of his admission that he did not recall a conversation regarding 
walk-ins until he spoke with Johnson long after this action was 
filed (Tr. 142 - 143). If a conversation in which Stevenson and 
Johnson agreed to refer walk-ins to Taylor occurred, it is unbe-
lievable that Taylor did not recall this qonversation at the 
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time he filed a lawsuit claiming that a duty to refer walk-ins 
was owed to HTA. 
Johnson's recollection was also questionable, and at 
one point he testified that the agreement was to refer walk-ins 
who came in as a result of the joint advertising campaign that 
was never implemented (Tr. 124 - 125, 202). Stevenson's testi-
mony made the most sense, in light of the factual context in 
which the conversations occurred. On February 17, 1977, union-
america wanted to list most of its properties while GPCC did not. 
The question Taylor had was whether he would receive a commissioi 
if GPCC sold one of its unlisted properties to a walkin, and 
Johnson answered in the affirmative. The conversation did not 
apply to Unionamerica and dealt with the question of commissions 
rather than referrals (Tr. 295 - 296, 301, 360 - 361). 
It is the trial court that determines the facts in a 
breach of contract case. Santi v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 442 
P.2d 921, 21 Utah 157 (1968). It is also the trial court's job 
to draw inferences from the facts, and the trial court should 
not be reversed unless no reasonable mind could draw the same 
inferences. Centurian Corp. v. Fiberchem, Inc., 562 P.2d 1252 
(Utah 1977). Even in an action seeking the equitable remedy of 
reformation, and even where the evidence is conflicting, the 
appellate court should defer to the advantaged position of the 
trial court hearing the evidence, and should not reverse factual 
findings even if it would have decided the matter differently. 
Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 557 P.2d 156 (Utah 1976); Del Porto v. 
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~· 495 P.2d 811, 27 Utah 2d. 286 (1972); Corbet v. Corbet, 
472 P.2d 430, 24 Utah 2d. 378 (1970). 
In the case at hand the oral agreement issue turned on 
the credibility of the various witnesses. It is obvious that 
the trial court accepted the testimony of Stevenson, and with 
good cause. An appellate court is not able to asssess the credi-
bility of witnesses in the way the trial court can and the 
trial court's assessments of witness credibility should not be 
disturbed on appeal. Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 (Utah 
1975); People's Finance & Thrift Co. of Ogden v. Doman, 497 P.2d 
17, 27 Utah 2d. 404 (1972). 
Under Utah law, reformation may not be ordered unless 
the evidence relied upon is clear and convincing. Sine v. 
Harper, 222 P.2d 571, 118 Utah 415 (1950). The proof required 
is greater than that required by the preponderance of the evi-
dence standard. Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194, 116 Utah 571 
(1949). Appellant simply did not meet its burden of proof. 
Appellant does not improve its position by relying upon 
the tort of intentional creation of civil liability under § 87la 
of Restatement of Torts 2d. In order to establish such a tort, 
appellant would first have to establish that Unionamerica and 
Stevenson had a duty to refer walk-ins to appellant. As has 
been shown above, appellant cannot establish such a duty under 
any express or imnplied provision of the written agreements, 
under any oral agreement, or under any theory of fiduciary duty. 
Also, it was not the referral by Unionamerica that made Skyline 
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the procuring cause of the sale and entitled it to the selling 
broker's commission, it was Skyline's own efforts. Finally, u 
will be discussed in more detail below, appellant cannot 
establish that Unionamerica acted with any intent to injure 
appellant. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS UNIONAMERICA, INC. AND STEVENSON ACTED IN 
GOOD FAITH WITH RESPECT TO THE REFERRAL OF JACK DAVIS, AND ACTED 
IN GOOD FAITH, WITH APPELLANT'S CONSENT, AND IN RELIANCE UPON 
THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL, IN DEPOSITING THE $96, 000 COMMISSION IN 1~; 
INTEREST BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT PENDING RESOLUTION OF THE 
DISPUTE BETWEEN APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT SKYLINE, AND THERE IS 
NO BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
A. RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH REGARDING THE 
REFERRAL OF JACK DAVIS 
Even though Stevenson had no fiduciary or contract~l 
duty to do so, he called HTA first when he learned of Davis, the 
prospective purchaser of the Village Property. Taylor was out 
of town and since Stevenson did not know if Taylor would be 
needed or whether Davis was really interested in the property, 
he did not attempt to contact Taylor further. Stevenson was 
acquainted both with Oswald, an HTA salesman, and Cole, who 
worked for Reed at Skyline. He contacted Reed and Cole rather 
than Oswald because he had more confidence in Reed's abilities. 
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He arranged for Reed and Cole to meet himself and Davis, only 
after lerning that Davis had questions he could not answer (Tr. 
325 - 327, 368 - 373). 
Stevenson never attempted to conceal or misrepresent 
how Davis learned of the Village Property and informed Taylor 
during their next conversation, on October 19, 1977, that 
Unionamerica had made the first contact with Davis. Stevenson 
testified that he could recall no oral agreement on February 17, 
1977 to refer walk-ins, and that the question of where walk-ins 
would be referred did not occur to him at that time. He never 
acted with the purpose to deprive HTA of any commission and the 
question of who would receive the selling broker's commission 
did not occur to him when he first contacted Reed and Cole (Tr. 
88, 294 - 296, 301, 329, 379). 
The foregoing is consistent only with the utmost of 
good faith on the part of Stevenson and Unionamerica. The main 
motivation of both Stevenson and Unionamerica was to consummate 
a sale of the Village Property on favorable terms. Although 
Stevenson wanted to involve Taylor personally, when Taylor was 
not available it was only natural for him to involve someone he 
had confidence in, especially since Volk, his superior, had not 
been able to meet Davis (Tr. 326). Even if a referral to Oswald 
had resulted in a sale, HTA or Taylor would have been entitled 
only to 25% of the selling broker's portion of the commission 
(Tr. 193 - 195). since Stevenson knew that the Settlement 
Agreement anticipated the involvement of other brokers, there 
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was no reason for him not to call on one of those brokers, 
especially since HTA as listing broker would get 40% of the com-
mission in any event if a sale occurred (Tr. 292). If, as H~ 
argues, Skyline was HTA's sub-agent, then a referral to Skyline 
was the same as a referral to HTA, just as a referral to Oswald 
would have been the same as a referral to HTA. There was no 
reason for Stevenson not to fully inform Taylor what had 
occurred, since he had no reason to think that he had done 
anything wrong. 
The evidence amply supports the finding of the trial 
court that there was no factual basis for a finding of con-
spiracy, conversion, wrongful creation of a liability, brea~cl 
a duty to act in good faith, breach of fiduciary duty or inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress (Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Appendix E). There is no basis for this 
court to disturb the trial court findings on these questions of 
fact. 
B. RESPONDENTS ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, WITH APPELLANT'S 
CONSENT, AND IN RELIANCE UPON THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL 
IN DEPOSITING THE $96, 000 COMMISSION IN AN INTEREST 
BEARING ESCROW ACCOUNT, AND THERE IS NO BAS IS FOR 
AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES. 
Appellant contends that it is entitled to an award of 
. · · f · nt issue punitive damages even though it lost on every s1gn1 ica 
before the trial court. Appellant cites Nash v. Craigco, I~1 
585 P.2d 775 (Utah 1978) for the proposition that punitive 
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damages may be awarded even where compensatory damages are not 
awarded. However compensatory damages were not sought in that 
case, and the court merely held that punitive damages may be 
awarded in an equitable action, if the defendant is held liable 
and the circumstances warrant. If compensatory damages are 
sought, punitive damages may not be awarded unless grounds for 
compensatory damages are established. Maw v. Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, 436 P.2d 230, 20 Utah 2d 195 (1968). In 
the case at hand, appellant established no grounds for either 
actual damages or equitable relief, and therefore punitive 
damages are precluded. 
Even if appellant had established liability on the part 
of respondents, this still would not have been an appropriate 
case for punitive damages. No Utah case that respondents are 
aware of has ever awarded punitive damages based solely on a 
breach of contract. The courts of many jurisdictions have held 
that punitive damages are generally not available in an action 
for breach of contract, unless some independent tort is 
involved. See, Temmen v. Kent-Brown Chevrolet Co., 605 P.2d 95, 
227 Kan. 45 (1980); Continental National Bank v. Evans, 489 P.2d 
15, 107 Ariz. 378 (1971); Waters v. Trenckmann, 503 P.2d 1187 
(Wyo. 1972). Although appellant attempts to characterize some 
of its claims against Unionamerica and Stevenson as tort claims, 
they are all based on the false premises that respondents had a 
contractual duty to refer walk-ins to appellant. 
Punitive damages may be awarded only if the conduct of 
-27-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant is willful and malicious. Palombi v. o. & c. 
Builders, 452 P.2d 325, 22 Utah 2d 297 (1%9). Punitive damages 
may not be awarded where defendant has actec'l in good faith, even 
though his actions were wrongful. Calhoun v. Universal Credit 
Co., 146 P.2d 284, 106 Utah 166 (1944). Stevenson's good faith 
regarding the referral of Davis has been discussed above. The 
claim for punitive damages against Unionamerica is based upon 
the actions of Stevenson and upon the good faith deposit of the 
commission due on the sale of the Village Property into an 
interest bearing escrow account, for the exclusive benefit of 
the contesting brokers. 
Unionamerica found itself confronted with an inter-
pleader situation, since it made no claim to the commimssion but 
was subject to the conflicting claims of HTA and Skyline. HTA 
argues that Unionamerica should have at least paid it the 40% 
1 isting broker commimssion. However, this was not what HTA was 
asking for. It was asking for for 100% (Tr. 90, Ex. P-10), and 
there is no evidence that it would have accepted less, so that 
tender of 40% would have been a futile act which Unionamerica 
was not required to perform. See, Williston on Contracts § 1819 
(3rd ed., 1972). Also, there was a real issue at trial as~ 
whether HTA had done anything to earn the 40% commission, even 
from Taylor's testimony (Tr. 124 - 130). HTA's anticipatory 
breach of the Settlement Agreement, by refusing to pay 60% of 
the commission to the selling broker, relieved Unionamerica of 
any duty to pay a commission until the dispute was resolved. 
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~· Williston on Contracts §§ 1300 et. seq. (3d ed., 1972), 
Understandably, Skyline would not consent to the release of the 
40% commission to HTA unless the 60% was released to it (Tr. 477 
- 478). Although Unionamerica may have believed the 60%-40% 
split was proper, it was in no position to act on that belief 
until the dispute was resolved. 
Three factors established Unionamerica's good faith 
beyond doubt. First, Taylor orally consented to the escrow 
arrangement on October 24, 1977, and his counsel acquiesced in 
the arrangement in a subsequent letter (Tr. 354, 472 - 473, 597, 
Ex. D-19). Second, Unionamerica acted upon the advice of coun-
sel in escrowing the entire commission (Tr. 355, 375 - 376, 
418). Third, the district court ratified the escrow arrangement 
and extended it indefinitely shortly after this action was filed 
(Appendix G). 
Unionamerica never converted the money to its own use 
and no party has been damaged from loss of the use of the money 
because it has continued to earn interest throughout this dis-
pute. The trial court's factual finding that Unionamerica acted 
reasonably should not be disturbed on appeal (Appendix E), 
Finally, since spite towards Cole motivated Taylor in this 
matter, it is he who has acted maliciously rather than 
Unionamerica or Stevenson (Tr. 595 - 596, 610 - 611, 644), 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY AND WITHIN ITS 
DISCRETION IN DECIDING NOT TO AWARD COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' FEEsm 
APPELLANT, AND APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO COSTS AND ATTORNEYS' 
FEES INCURRED ON THIS APPEAL. 
The sole cause for this litigation has been Taylor's 
and HTA' s unjustified claim to 100% of the commission due on the 
sale of the Village Property. For HTA to contend it is entitlea 
to attorneys' fees based upon a trial court judgment ordering 
the very 60%-40% split of the commission which all respondents 
offered to HTA years ago is ludicrous. Even if appellant had 
prevailed at trial on some of its breach of contract claims, the 
trial court would have been within its discretion to refuse to 
award attorneys' fees, despite provisions in the contract 
calling for attorneys' fees. Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606 
(Utah 1976). 
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, the trial court 
did award appellant a commission of $2,550 on a sale of property 
from Unionamerica to Davis not related to the Village Property 
sale. However the Settlement Agreement does not provide for 
attorneys' fees and no separate listing agreement was made on 
this second property. Attorneys' fees may not be awarded in 
Utah except pursuant to contract or statute. Stubbs v. Hemm~' 
567 P.2d 168 (Utah 1977). Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 
1976). No statue applies here. Again, the trial court's dis· 
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cretion regarding attorneys' fees should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
Attorneys' fees on appeal are usually not awarded 
unless the position of one party is frivolous. See, Bates v. 
~· 560 P.2d 706 (Utah 1977). If this is the standard, then 
it is respondents that are entitled to attorneys' fees on 
appeal, not appellant. 
CONCLUSION 
Unionamerica and Stevenson owed no fiduciary, 
contractual, or other duty to refer Davis to HTA. Unionamerica 
and Stevenson have acted with the utmost of good faith regarding 
both the referral of Davis and the deposit of the commimssion 
into an interest bearing escrow account. The trial court's 
findings, conclusions and judgment are amply supported by both 
the evidence and the law and should not be disturbed on appeal, 
The trial court exercised its discretion properly in refusing to 
award attorneys' fees. If any part is entitled to attorneys' 
fees on this appeal, it is respondents. 
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Respectfully Submitted, 
PRINCE, YEATES, & GELDZAHLER 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the '?-C/jt:r;"day of April , 
1981, I served two copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondents 
upon Kent. B. Linebaugh, Esq. of Jardine, Linebaugh, Brown & 
Dunn at 370 East South Temple, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. of Martineau, Rooker, Larsen 
& Kimball at 36 South State Street, No. 1800, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 by leaving the same at his office with his clerk or 
other person in charge thereof. 
PRINCE, YEATES, & GELDZAHLER 
By: 
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• 
February 17, 1977 
The following sets forth the terms of an agreement between l-I:ll Taylor, William 
Stevenson~ice President of U:ii.onamerica (Westmor), and Ray Johnson, President 
of Greater Park City Company, to settle the lawsuit Taylor vs. Greater Park Citv 
Company, c:t. al. • 
It is agreed that Unionamerica (lf/estmo~ and Greater Park City Company 
will enter into exclusive listing a,,"Teements with Hal Taylor and Associates for the 
next five (5) years for all properties located within Summit County which Unionamerica 
(Westmor) or Greater Park City Company desire to sell with the exception of the pro-
perties actually used for skiliig by Greater Park City Company. 
This agreement is voided if Hal Taylor and Associates is sold in whole bj· 
Mr. Taylor '2!ld this agreement as it affects ooly Hal Taylor and Associates and 
Greater Park City Company is void if Greater Park City Company changes ownership 
in whole. 
Unionam.erica (Westmor) will immediately enter in an exclusive listing agree-
ment with Hal Taylor and Associates for the 10. 5 acres of land commooly called the 
"Village Land" and the approximate 8. 3 acres of land com:mo::i.ly called "Comstock/ 
Claimjumper II". Greater Park City Compa.riy will immediately enter icto an e.'!:clusiYe 
listing agreement 'l'-ith Hal Taylor and Associates for the remaining Snow Country Con-
dominiums. Further, the listing agreement between Unionamerica (Westmor) and 
Hal Taylor :J..nd Associates will provide for a splitting of advertising costs up to $5, 000 
on a to-be-agreed-upon advertising schedule. 
Twenty-Five Thol!sand Eight Hundred Dollars ($25, SOC) will be paid to J:I:il 
Taylor and Associates as follows: 
Within fifteen (15) days following dismissal of all cl:llms, Unioa:unerica 
will pay to Hal Taylor and Associates Twelve Thousand Nine Hundred 
Dollars ($12, 900) cash. 
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Within filteeu (15) cbys following c:is::::-,issal of all clnirns, Grc:ilc; 
Park City Company will either p:i.y a li~e amotU1t or ~;ivc Hal 'J'ayit: 
and Associates a note for Twelve Thousand .i\inc Hundred Dollars 
($12, 900) all due and p:i.yable within one (1) year plus interest at fr 
rate of eight and one-half percent (a. 5:;). 
On all property listed with Taylor, he will be required to perform the 
usual real estate broker activities and will be entitled to a commission rate, o! 
six percent (6%), and Taylor \viil further agree to a fee-splitting arrangement~·": 
si>..""ty percent (GO~) to the selling broker and forty percent (40%) to the listing br1£ 
· This settlement includes a dismissal with prejudice of all claims incluc:: 
in the above mentioned action and an agreement on the part of all parties to bear: 
own costs and e:...-penses. 
AGREED AND ACCEPTED: 
UNIONAMERICA (\Vestmor) 
GREATER PARK CITY CO~IPANY 
HAL TAYLOR AND ASSOCIATES / 
I _,;'·. ; 
'(/"/ ~-- 0/1/ .. 
· - I ~-"~/ / /, 'fa Ey ' ,_/ . ~ I • ~ /{ .... .. ( --
/ 
./ 
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Kent B Linebaugh 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, SROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
79 South State Streer 
4~0 Conrnercial Security Rank Buildina 
P. 0. Box 11501 " 
Salt Lake City, Uta:1 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
; l LED 
Ck .... : .1 ::o· , 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTR~·~;­
COU?lTY OF SU?1l'IT, STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah corporation, and 
HAROLD I./. TAYLO"., 
) 
) 
) 
) 
J iSiJ 
vs. 
Plaintiffs, ) 
) 
) 
O:tDER DENYING !IOTION OF 
DC!"ENDAllTS' SKYLlllE REED AND 
cou: FOR PA!'.TlAL suil!IARY Jll"JG~!ElIT ) 
UNIO:IAHETUCA. me. ' a cor- ) 
poration, aka WESTIIOR; ) 
RAl'SIIIRE, I:IC. , a corpnra- ) 
tion; WIT.T.JAM R. sn:vr·:NSON;) 
!'ARI: CITY ;~"Sl-:J!VA1' LONS, ) 
INC., a cnrporation di>~ ) 
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. ) 
REED; and GARY COLE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~) 
Civil No. 5557 
0 R D E R 
This matter h.winr, come on for hearing pursuant co 
tloticc be fore the .ihnve entitlcJ Court on the 2nd <lay o( 
April, 1979, Plaintiffs appearing by and through their 
counsel of record, Kent B Linebaugh of Jardine. Linebaugh, 
Bro•m & Dunn, an<l Defendants Skyline, Reed .ind Cole 
appearing by .ind through their counsel of record, Stephen 
G. Crockett of Martineau & Maak, and 1)efendants Union-
america, Ramshire and Stevenson appearing i:iy and chrou:;h 
their couns<.!l o( recorJ, Onna.1.J J. Winder o( rrince, 
Yeates & Geldzahler, the Court having heard the agruments 
of counsel and considered the relevant memorandu.~ filed in 
behalf of Defendants Skyline, Reed and Cole, and being other-
wise fully .i<lvise<l in the premioes, 
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The Court finds thac che Sectlement Agreecenc and tho 
Listing Agreemenc contemplace thac ocher parties noc in-
volved in the lawsuit might find buyers for the l~stc<l 
properties and negotiate a sale therefor, and that neither 
Agreement contains any express or implied provision chat 
Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" 
to Plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolvi.!d for all 
future proceedings in this case. 
But further issues of fact remain to be determined 
with respect to Counts V, VI, IX, X and XI and. 
IT IS HE~.EBY 0!1.D"::RED that the Motion of Oe[endancs 
Skyline, Reer.J and Cole Cor P.'.lrtial Summary Ju<lr,menc o[ 
Dismissal of sair.J Counts be.1nd ·~s hereby denied. 
DATED this ~day o~ 1979. 
CERTIFICATE OF SER'!lCE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Order was served 
this JJ1± day of May, 1979 by depositing copies of same 
in the United States mail, first class postage pre?aid, 
addressed to: 
Stephen G. ~rockett 
t1artineau & Maak d 
Attorneys for Defendants Skyline. Ree "' 
36 So. State. Suite 1800 . 
Salt Lake City. Utah 3411• 
Donnld J. ~in<ler 
Prince Yeates & Gcldzahler . ~ Attorn~ys for Defendants· Unionamerica. 
;ind Stevenson 
424 E~<t 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DIS':'RICT COURT Or" THI:: THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
1:-l AND t"OR SUMMIT COU!'TY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
Ci:ah corporation, and 
1-!AROLD W. TAYLOR, 
PL:iintiffs, 
vs. 
:;~\ i.J~\,-U'-:ERICA, I1:c., 3 corp-
or~tilJn, aka ~\EST!-IOR; Wi-
Sr!I?J:, L)C .. a corporation; 
P,\RK CITY R1'SCRVATIOtlS. INC., 
~ corporation. Jb~ S~~LINC 
RicAL-;"Y, llARRY F. Rl:J;D; anJ 
(;,\;;Y COLE, 
De fondants. 
CIVIL NO. 5557 
l1iil l Z. IS~O 
The Court is ot the opinion that the record of this case 
cJ.nd thi: ~vid~nce:: .5uflro=ts the following findings on the issues 
1. 1~ot P~1~~ CiLy Kcs~rvcltions, Inc. w~s a licenseJ 
reul t]Jtdtl' broker clt all times ui.aterial to the issues of i:his case. 
2. llJl Iavl0r A•sociates Jid ~cr[orm all Sl!rvices and dis-
char~~d all obli;acions required of it by the Settlement Agree~ent 
.:Jr.J the \'illiag~ lisci.nt;. 
3. The orJ~r of Judge Croft entered June 4, 1979, is a 
vai.id and b indinr, nrJ~r which resolved all issues therein together 
uith all future prucc~dings of this case. 
4. That tl1e s.,~tll!ment Agreement was !!!:.£reformed by any 
oral a;;reem.;nc of ch" yarties or mutual mistake of the parties. 
S. Thni: i'laini:.i.ff is entitled to the relief demanded in 
Count Ill of its Fourth Amended Complaint and is awarded judgmer.t 
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HAL TAYLOR, ET AL 1:. 
u:llONAJU:RICA, !::T AL ' .... ;[ T\10 ME!IORANDUH DEC: 
6. That the claims of plain ti ifs on all other counts: 
their Fourth ,\mt<nc.icc.i Complaint are not 8uppt.lrted by the r.cor: .. 
the evid.,nce .:inJ th~ Court finds in favor of the defendants •:: 
against the plaintiffs. 
7. That t.he real estate con.:1ission now held in escm 
gethcr with all '1ccumula.ted interest should be divid•d 407, to: 
plaintiffs and 60:' to the defendant Park City Reservations,::: 
The Court ·.;uuld request that both counsel for defendoc: 
join in prep.:iring and subrr.ictin~ finding~ of Fac.:c, Concli.:sion: 
La\\. and Judgnicnt consi5CL!nt with tht:? foregoing ruli.nz co the~. 
pursu:int to the r;.ile" of the Third Judici;il District Court. 
-
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah corporation, and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corpora-
tion, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, 
INC. , a corporation; WILLIA.'! R. 
STI:VE:NSON; PARK CITY RESERVA-
TIONS, INC. , a corporation, 
dba SKYLWE REALTY; HARRY F. 
REED; and GARY COLE, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
~ ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND cof'lctusfoNs OF LAW 
Civil ~lo. 5557 
The above entitled matter came on for trial without a 
jury, on January 14, 1980, before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorabre James S. Sawaya, District Court Judge, presiding. 
Plaintiffs were represented by their counsel, Kent B. Linebaugh; 
defendants Unionamerica, Inc., Ramshire, and William R. Stevenson 
were represented by their counsel F. S. Prince, Jr.; and defen-
dants Park City Reservations, dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. Reed, 
and Gary Cole were represented by their counsel, Stephen G. 
Crockett. 
The Court having heard and considered the evidence, 
together with the arguments of counsel, and being fully advised 
in the premises, hereby makes and enters its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of law as follows: 
FWDINGS OF FACT 
l. Plaintiff, Hal Taylor Associates (HTA) is a Utah 
corporation and has its principal place of business in SlllllDlit 
County, Utah. 
2. Plaintiff Harold W. Taylor (Taylor) is a resident 
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of Summit County, State of Utah. Harold W. Taylor is the sole 
owner of Hal Taylor Associates and is a real estate broker 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah. 
3. Defendant Unionamerica, Inc. (Unionamerica) is, 
foreign corporation qualified to transact business in the State 
of Utah, and having its principal place of business in the Stati 
of Utah in Summit County. 
4. Defendant Ramshire, Inc. (Ramshire) is a wholli 
owned subsidiary of Unionamerica and is a foreign corporation 
qualified to transact business in the State of Utah, having iti 
principal place of business in the State of Utah in Summit 
County. 
5. Defendant Park City Reservations, Inc., dba 
Skyline Realty (Skyline) is a Utah corporation, having its prt,· 
cipal place of business in SUlll!Uit County, and was a licensed r• 
estate broker at all times material to the issues of this cm 
6. Defendant William R. Stevenson (Stevenson) is• 
resident of the State of California. Defendant Stevenson am: 
as Vice President of defendant Ramshire durine the period oft~ 
material to the allegations contained in plaintiffs' ccmolaint. 
7. Defendant Harry F. Reed (Reed) is a resident o! 
and has his principal place of business in Su=it County, Stati 
of Utah. Defendant Reed is the owner of Skyline and at all ti:l 
relevant to this action, was a real estate broker licensed to; 
business in the State of Utah. 
8. Defendant Gary Cole (Cole) is a resident of anc 
has his principal place of business in Summit County, State 01 
Utah. Defendant Cole at all times relevant to this action ••11 
real estate salesman licensed by the State of Utah in the offi•' 
of Skyline. 
-2-
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9. On February 17, 1977, plaintiffs Hal Taylor and Hal 
Taylor Associates enc-red into a written agreement ("the Sec~le­
menc Agreement") to settle a lawsuit then pending by them against 
Greater Park City Company (GPCC) and defendant Unionamerica. 
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, defendant Unionamerica 
agreed to enter into an exclusive listing agreement with HTA for 
any property that it might wish co sell over a period of five 
years. The Settlement Agreement provided chat HTA would be re-
quired co perform the usual real estate broker activities and 
"(Taylor) will be entitled to a commission race, of six percent, 
and Taylor will further agree co a fee splitting arrangement 
~iving sixty percent (601.) co the selling broker and forty per-
cent (40%) co the listing broker." 
10. Also on February 17, 1977, HTA entered into a 
Vacant Property Listing Agreement .for the sale of approxi.l!lately 
10.5 acres of property (the "Village" property) in Park City, 
Utah, owned by defendant Rar:ishire, Inc. 
11. The entire agreement between plaintiffs Hal Taylor 
and Hal Taylor Associates and defendants Unionamerica, Inc., and 
Ramshire, Inc., is contained in the Settlement Agreement and the 
Vacant Property Listing Agreement. These agreements were not 
altered or added co by any oral agreements between the parties, 
now was there any fraud on the part of one or more defendants nor 
any mutual mistake involved in the formation of these agreements. 
12. None of the parties co the foregoing Agreement 
disclosed the terms thereof co Skyline Realty or any of its 
officers or agents. Shortly after entering into the February 17, 
1977, Agreement, the plaintiffs contacted Skyline Realty and 
requested the assistance of Skyline Realty in selling the prq-
perty. Each of the parties understood that should Skyline sell 
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the property, it would be entitled to receive sixty percent (60'.: 
of the comm:~ssion from any such sale. 
13. On or prior to October 1, 1977, Mr. Jack Davis 
(Davis), the evencual purchaser of the "Village" property, had 1 
telephone conversation with Mr. Robert Volk, the President of 
Unionamerica, Inc. This conversation was arTanged by a 111Utual 
acquaintance. Davis indicated he was interested in purchasing 
property in a resort area, to wit, the "Village" property in Pa:i 
City, Utah. Davis and Volk agreed, either in this initial 
conversation or in a subsequent one, to meet in Park City, Utah. 
so thac Davis could see the property. 
14. On the morning of October 3rd, Volk directed 
Stevenson to fly froc Los Angeles to Salt Lake City for the 
purpose of meeting him and Jack Davis, and showing Davis the 
"Village" property. Stevenson had previously been informed cha. 
there was someone in San Diego expressing interest in the pro· 
perty, although he had noc yet heard of the ·Davis name. 
15. Volk was unable to meet in Park City and insmo:· 
ed Stevenson to go to Park City to meet Davis. 
16. Davis and his wife went to Park City, Utah, on or 
abouc October 3, 1977. They either talked to or met briefly If.:: 
Stevenson on the night of October 3rd. 
17. On October 3rd, after being told to ~o co Park 
City to meet Davis, Stevenson called Taylor's office co see if'.! 
would be available. He was told that Taylor was out of cown an: 
would not be back until later in the week. 
18. After he arTived at the Salt Lake City Ai~orc. 
and after trying to contact Taylor, Stevenson called Cole and 
asked if he could meet with Cole and Reed at Cole's house in Pt' 
City. He told Cole chat there was a person interested in che 
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"Village" land and inquired as to whether Cole and Reed would be 
available the next day to meet with Stevenson and the interested 
party (Davis) . 
19. Stevenson, Reed, Cole, and Mr. and Mrs. Davis met 
on the morning of October 4th at the Eating Establishment in Park 
City for breakfast. After breakfast the five people went in 
Reed's car to acquaint the Davis' with the City of Park City in 
general and the "Village" property in particular. 
20. Stevenson did not see Jack Davis again between the 
time they parted on October 4th and the time the Earnest Money 
Agreement was signed on October 17th. 
21. Subsequent to the meeting on October 4th, and at 
Davis' invitation, Reed and Cole went to· San Diego and cet with 
Davis in the latter's office. At that time Davis executed the 
Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, and delivered to 
Reed and Cole the earnest money required by the offer. Lacer the 
same day, Stevenson and Cole, representing Mr. Davis, went to Los 
Angeles and presented the offer to Stevenson who accepted on 
behalf of Ramshire. 
22. Mr. Davis testified and the Court 10 finds that 
Mr. Davis after meeting Reed and Cole decided that he wanted Reed 
and Cole to represent his interests in Park City, Utah. 
23. Prior to obtaining the Earnest Honey Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase, defendant Reed confirmed with plaintiff Taylor 
that Taylor had a listing relating to the property and that 
Taylor would be willing to split the commission on any sale in 
accordance with the usual custom in the community, !!!- forty 
percent (407.) to the listing broker and sixty percent (607.) to 
the selling broker. At the time Reed disclosed that he had a 
possible buyer for the property, Reed did not disclose that the 
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client had been referred to Skyline by defendant Stevenson, ~ 
officer of defendant Ramshire, Inc. 
24. On October 26, 1977, Ramshire, Inc., and Davis 
executed the Real Estate Agreement, and Davis paid the 525,000.0: 
due at that time, to the escrow agent. 
25. Since the date of the Real Estate Agreement, Davi; 
has paid for and obtained conveyance of two of the parcels of 
property described in the Real Estate Agreement, and has con-
structed, or is in the process of constructing, approximately l4. 
condominium units. 
26. At the time of the first of the multiple closings 
called for in the Real Estate Agreement, Unionamerica, pursuan: 
to the provisions of paragraph l3 of the Agreement, deposited::; 
$96, 000. 00 in an interest bearing escrow account pending settle· 
ment or resolution of the dispute between the brokers. None of 
the defendants have at any time since chat closing had the use~: 
,!>enefit of the $96, 000. 00 so .~ioname;ica·~-cted - ~ 
. reasonably in so depositing these funds in an escrow account in 
". light of the dispute. 
'-=--- 27. Skyline Realty by and through its agents, Reed u.: 
Cole, fully performed the obligations required of a selling 
broker under the fee splitting agreement reached between plain· 
tiffs and Skyline Realty. 
28. The Court finds chat any defense as co the lack~: 
capacity by che defendant Park City Reservations, Inc .. to main· 
tain chis action should have been pleaded in plaintiffs' answer 
co the counterclaim asserted by Park City Reservations Inc.• or, 
at the very lease, prior to trial. Although che plaintiffs iud 
knowledge of che facts upon which they based the defense a5 to 
lack of capacity, such defense was not raised until the trial v1J 
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almost complete. 
29. During 1979, Unionamerica or one of its subsi· 
diaries sold a condominium apartment to Mr. Jack Davis for the 
sum of $42,500.00. The parties negotiated directly and concluded 
the sale without assistance of a real estate broker. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
l. Plaintiffs Hal Taylor and HTA performed all ser-
vices and discharged all obligations required of them by tha Set-
tlement Agreement and the Vacant Property Listing Agreement. 
2. The Settlement Agreement and the Vacant Property 
Listing Agreement were not altered, added to or modified by oral 
agreement of the parties, nor will these agreements be reformed 
on the grounds of mutual mistake or fraud. 
3. Park City Reservations, Inc., was a licensed real 
estate broker at all times material to the issues of this case. 
4. The Settlement Agreement and the Vacant Property 
Listing Agreement contemplate that, in addition to HTA, other 
brokers might find buyers for the listed properties and negotiate 
sales therefore. Neither agreement contains any express or im· 
plied provisions that Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct to 
HTA persons making inquiries about the listed properties. 
5. Unionamerica acted reasonably in paying the 
$96,000.00 commission into an interest bearing escrow account 
pending settlement or resolution of the dispute between the 
brokers, and Unionamerica's failure to pay HTA strictly in ac-
cordance with the terms of the listing agreement is excused. 
6. HTA is entitled to receive forty percent (40%) of 
the $96,000,00 held in the escrow account, together with the 
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interest thereon accrued, and Park City Reservations, Inc., is 
entitled ~o receive the remaining sixty percent (507.) of the 
$96, 000. 00 held in such account, together with interest acct\led 
thereon. 
7. HTA is entitled to judgment against Unionameri'a 
and Ramshire in the amount of six percent (6'7.) of $42 ,500.00, or 
$2,550.00, together with interest thereon at the rate of six 
percent (67.) per annum from the date of sale of the condominiu: 
apartment to Jack Davis to the date of judgment, and together 
with interest at the rate of eight percent (87.) per annlll!l froo 
the date of judgment until paid. 
8. The Court finds there is no factual basis for a 
finding of a conspiracy. conversion, wrongful creation of a lia· 
bility, breach of a duty to act in good faith, ~reach of a 
fiduciary duty. or intentional infliction of mental distress, u: 
the Court concludes that none of the foregoing torts occurred i,. 
this case. 
9. The Court having concluded that defendants were 
not guilty of tortious acts a~ainst the plaintiffs, and chat n~-' 
of the parties breached the applicable contracts. hereby con· 
eludes there is no basis for plaintiff's claim for punitive 
damages. 
lO. By virtue of plaintiffs' failure to timely raise 
the defense of lack of capacity to maintain this action, th• 
Court finds that any such defense was waived by the plaintiffs. 
The Court further finds that any such defense must fail because 
at all times pertinent to this action the defendant Harry F. R11' 
was a broker licensed by the State of Utah and was operating oi 
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behalf of Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline Realty. 
MADE AND ENTERED this -- day of -----· 1980. 
BY TiiE COURT: 
James s. Sawaya, Judge 
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tu THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF trrAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah corporation, and 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC., a corpora-
tion, aka WESTMOR; RA.~SHIRE, 
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM R. 
STEVENSON; PARl< CITY RESERVA-
TIONS, INC., a corporation, 
dba Sk'YI.INE REALTY; HARRY F. 
REED; and GARY COU:, 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
_____________ ) 
J U D G M E N T 
Civil No. 5557 
The above entitled cause came on regularly for trial, 
without a jury, on January 14, 1980, before the Honorable James 
S. Sawaya, District Court Judge: Plaintiffs were represented by 
their counsel, Kent B. Linebaugh; defendants Unionamerica, Inc., 
Ramshire, and William R. Stevenson were represented by their 
counsel, F. S. Prince, Jr.; and defendants Park City Reserva-
tions, Inc., dba Skyline Realty, Harry F. Reed and Gary Cole were 
represented by their counsel, Stephen G. Crockett. 
The Court having considered the evidence and the argu-
ments of counsel, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
l. That plaintiff Hal Taylor Associates have and re-
cover from defendant Unionamerica, Inc., the sum of $96,000.00 
together with the interest that has accrued thereon in the escrow 
account into which said sum has been placed. 
2. That defendant Park City Reservations, Inc., dba 
Skyline Realty, have and recover from plaintiff Hal Taylor 
Appendix F 
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Associates the sum of $57,600.00, together with the interest 
thereon that has accrued i 1 the escrow account i·•to which the 
$96,000.00 has been placed. 
3. The foregoing Judgment shall be satisfied by 
distributions from the escrow account to the parties as follows: 
(a) Hal Taylor Associates and Harold W. Taylor 
shall receive forty percent (407.) of the $96,000.00 
deposited by Unionamerica and/or Ramshire, Inc., and t 
addition any interest that has accrued on the forty 
percent (407.) to be distributed; and 
(b) Park City Reservations, Inc., dba Skyline 
Realty shall receive the remaining sixty percent (60',) 
of the $96, 000. 00 deposited by Unionamerica and/or 
Rams hire, Inc., and in addition any interest that has 
accrued on the sixty percent (607.) to be distributed. 
4. That Swmnit County Title Company, the escrow ageo: 
is hereby ordered to make such distributions from the escrow 
account upon receipt of this Judgment. 
5. That plaintiffs have and recover from defendant,, ~ o?• 
Unionamerica the sum of $2, 550. 00 together with interest thereoo 
r<J ;-v~. -' , making f J l .' ' "1 -.<:r i.·n the amount of $ rom ci.-, • , 
1 
11 
a total judgment of $ ')_ [ 7 'ii'• ~~ to bear interest at the 
rate of eight percent (81.) per annum. ,a/ 1 ~3 J dj · 
6. That the parties shall bear their own costs in 
this matter. 
MADE AND ENTERED this -- day of '1980 
-----
BY THE COURT: 
-James S. Sawaya, Judge 
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Kent B Linebaugh 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
400 Commercial Security Bank Building 
79 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 11503 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-7700 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD W. TAYLOR, dba 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
UNIONAHERICA, INC. , a cor- ) 
poration, aka WESTMOR; ) 
RAMSHIRE, INC. , a corpora- ) 
tion; WILLIAM R. STEVENSON;) 
PARK CITY RESERVATIONS, ) 
INC., a corporation, dba ) 
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. ) 
REED; and GARY COLE, ) 
Defendants. 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
ORDER 
ORDER RE: MOTIONS OF 
DEFENDA..~TS, UNIONAMERICA, 
RAMSHIRE AND STEVENSON, TO 
DISMISS AND IN THE NATURE 
OF INTERPLEADER; AND PLAIN-
TIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 5557 
This matter came on for hearing on the 5th day 
of September, 1978, before the above-entitled court, the 
Honorable DEAN E. CONDER presiding, pursuant to written 
notices with respect to the above-designated motions, plain-
tiff appearing by and through his coun.sel of record, Kent B 
Linebaugh, defendants, Unionamerica, Ramshire and Stevenson, 
appearing by and through their counsel of record, Donald J. 
Winder, and defendants, Skyline, Reed and Cole, appearing 
-by and through their counsel of record, Stephen G. Crockett, 
the court having heard the arguments of counsel, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as 
follows: Appendix G 
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1. That the Motion of defendants, Unionamerica,: 
Rams hire and Stevenson, to dismiss be and hereby is denied ; 
without prejudice to bringing such motion again in response l 
to subsequent pleadings. I 
I 
2. That the Motion of defendants, Unionamerica i 
'. 
Ramshire and Stevenson, in the nature of an interpleader 
be and hereby is denied, and the parties are ordered 
to cause the $96, 000. 00 commission to be maintained in an 
interest-bearing account subject to withdrawal only on the 
order of the court. 
3. That plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment be and hereby is denied without prejudice to 
bringing such motion again subsequent to additional plead-
ings being filed herein. 
4. That plaintiff's oral motion for leave to 
file a Second Amended Complaint be and hereby is granted, 
which Complaint shall be served upon opposing counsel and 
mailed for filing herein on or before September 20, 1978. 
5. That on or before September 20, 1978, plain· 
tiff's counsel shall serve and mail for filing herein a 
Statement of Points and Authorities in support of plain-
tiff's contention that punitive damages are recoverable 
for breaches of contract as averred in plaintiff's Second 
Amended Complaint. 
Dated as of the 5th day of September, 1978. 
~~~~~..-~~~~~~-----De an E. Conder 
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